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I. Introduction

PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Good morning.
Thank you so much for coming to the annual symposium of
the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. My name is Penny
White, and I have the distinguished opportunity to faculty
advise this law [journal], the Tennessee Journal of Law and
Policy. And that's why I am here today. I get the experience
of working with incredible students at the College of Law.
And one of those is Sean Francis, who is this year's
Symposium Editor. I'm going to turn it over to Sean who will
introduce our keynote address speaker. However, as you all
know Micki, I have reminders for you from Micki before we
get started.
Reminder number one, because of the crowd some of
you will be sending in your big $25 check for CLE fees later.
That's fine. But if you don't turn in your attendance report
before you leave today, she will not give you credit. So you
have that separate attendance report. Be sure and make sure


Dan Kahan is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Professor
of Psychology at Yale Law School. In addition to risk perception, his
areas of research include criminal law and evidence. Prior to coming to
Yale in 1999, Professor Kahan was on the faculty of the University of
Chicago Law School. He also served as a law clerk to Justice Thurgood
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court (1990–91) and to Judge Harry
Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(1989–90). He received his B.A. from Middlebury College and his J.D.
from Harvard University.
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Micki gets that before you leave.
Secondly, we don't apologize for the crowd, we're
delighted by the crowd. But the reason that we do not have
an overflow room with this on a television for you and others
to watch is that we simply don't have enough space at the
College of Law today with all the classes going on to have
an overflow room. So I hope you won't be too
uncomfortable, and I hope you'll just still be glad that you
came even after a crowded day.
So with no more ado, Sean Francis, who has put this
thing together.
MR. SEAN FRANCIS: I would like to echo
Professor White. The turnout is great. We're very happy to
have all of you here. As she said, my name is Sean Francis.
I'm the Symposium Editor for the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy.
If I may, I would like to get just a few thank-yous
out of the way. Of course, I would like to thank the
University of Tennessee College of Law. They provided
these facilities here for us to have the symposium. Without
them, we would be meeting at a Waffle House somewhere
and it would not be nearly as nice, so we appreciate that.
Along that same vein, I would like to thank Micki
Fox, the CLE director. You guys know how much work she
puts into these things; the registrations, the fees, putting
together the credits for you guys, getting the verification for
CLE for the credits. All of that is Micki, and more. So we
definitely thank her for her help. I would also like to thank
Jeff Groah, our audio/visual guy. He's back there in the back
making sure everything is working well. If anything goes
wrong, you can blame him, so get a good look at his face.
It's not my fault.
And then I would also like to thank the Advocacy
and Dispute Resolution Center. They're the ones who
provided the financial backing for all of this. They funded
[8]
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the little snacks that we have for you guys. All of the fees
and registration that we had for this, all of that was them. So
we would like to thank them.
And, finally, we would like to thank the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy. They provided the manpower
behind all of this. They organized all of this. And without
them, none of this would have been possible. So if I can have
just a short plug for the Journal, it was established in 2004.
It produces twice yearly publications on the subject of law
as it intersects with decision-making or policy-making. So
any of you who work with lawmakers or who are lawmakers,
or who work in the policy-making arena, it's a really great
resource for all of you. And even if you don't, you're just
interested in those topics, I would encourage you to check
out the editions that we have out and the future editions that
we will publish.
One more short housekeeping note about the
schedule today. So the morning session—I'll just go over
that now. We'll begin with Professor Kahan's address here in
a few minutes after I introduce him. After which, we'll have
a short fifteen minute break. And then we'll have a panel of
experts and practitioners in the field of law who will come
up and react to his speech and answer questions from the
audience. So, please, think of your questions as they speak
and as Professor Kahan speaks, and feel free to ask as many
questions as you might have.
So without any further ado, I would like to introduce
Dr. Dan Kahan. He is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of
Law and Psychology at the University—at Yale University
College of Law. He is also a member of the Cultural
Cognition Project, which is a group of scholars who seek to
analyze the impact of group values on perceptions and
related facts.
And that's what he has generally come here to speak
to us about today. So I would like to ask you to join me in
welcoming Dr. Dan Kahan.
[9]
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II. Keynote Address

PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: It was really just an
honor to receive the invitation. And I want to thank the
Journal and also Penny for giving me this opportunity. And
actually, everybody has been really nice to me since I got
here. And I'm sure that that reflects a sort of friendship
[indiscernible]. [Laughter.] It's really great to have that kind
of relationship with you.
Now, I saw what's been going on here just a little bit
in today's politics, and it made me realize that really, if you
want to get people to listen to you, you have to make a really
bold claim. Right. So I'm going to make three really bold
claims. Kind of give me a chance here and don't all rush me
[indiscernible] that way. But one of them that's especially
bold is that judges and lawyers, they don't see things the way
that ordinary people do. Now, you're already kind of saying,
come on. And so I'll just add a little proviso. They don't see
things the way that the public does, well, except when they
do.
Now, the second claim, bold claim, this is generally
a good thing, that judges and lawyers think differently from
ordinary people. You know, just give me a chance here and
I'll qualify it a little. It's generally good, but sometimes it can
also be bad. So those are my three very bold claims. And I'm
going to make out these claims by going through a series of
studies with you. And the first one actually has to
acknowledge that it has roots in Tennessee. It's a study that
initially we pretested within Justice Koch's fellow members
of the Inns of Court in Nashville. So I don't know if that
disqualifies him from being on the jury, actually the judge,
the work.
Now, the paper that reports the results of this study
has a title based off protests, which is an allusion to a famous
study conducted in the 1950s where the researchers asked
students from two rival colleges to watch the tape of the
[10]
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football game between their two schools and decide whether
the referee had made the right call or the wrong call on
certain disputed calls during the game. And what they found
is that the students from Dartmouth, they were all convinced
that the official must be a referee of Princeton or something,
he was so biased. And whereas the students from Princeton,
they said, you know, what's going on? Did they bribe the
referee? We can't believe he's this unfair. Right. So the
students were conforming what they saw on the tape
essentially to their institutional affiliation. And this is what's
referred to in psychology as identity protective cognition.
People are going to selectively credit the information with
the arguments of the judgments about the credibility of the
speaker, it could be the quality of scientific data, to the
interest of some kind of special group. They're going to do
that because they want to maintain their standing and status
in the group. And if you take positions that are contrary to
the other group members, well, then sometimes they might
look down on you. Right. So this is identity protective
cognition. And what we wanted to do was see whether this
might actually apply in law.
But by the way, don't you see the one from
Tennessee, he's clearly out of bounds. Right. I mean, I see it,
so. But we thought, well, does this identity protective
cognition actually influence how fact finders in law are
performing their duties? So we took a sample, not of judges
and lawyers as we did that day at the Inns of Court with Dean
Koch, but just ordinary individuals. Two hundred people
who were drawn from a Nashville panel, the kind of people
who might be on a jury. And we told them, imagine you are
on a jury and it's a suit by political protestors against the
police, that a political protestor said that the police violated
their First Amendment rights when they ordered them to end
their demonstration. And the police on the other hand said
that they weren't violating the First Amendment rights of the
protestors. The protestors had crossed the line from speech
[11]
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to intimidation, that they were waving their signs in a
menacing fashion at passersby, screaming in their face.
That's not protected by the First Amendment. And blocking
access to the building that you see in the background.
Now, we have an experimental component in this
study. We told half the people that the protest was happening
at an abortion clinic and that the protestors were against the
right to an abortion. And we told the other half of the sample
that this demonstration was at a college recruitment center,
and that the demonstrators were expressing their opposition
to excluding gay and lesbian individuals from the military. I
see we have some younger people, that's well before your
time. Actually, that used to be the policy of the United States.
It got changed. But we did our—we collected our data before
President—then President Obama had changed that.
There were also laws that were specific to each one
of the two conditions, right, so that the subject—study
subjects for the abortion clinic condition, they were to apply
a statute that says it's illegal to interfere with, to obstruct or
intimidate or threaten people who are trying to access a
facility where abortions are being given. And the police have
the power if people—they see people doing that, to disperse
them or else arrest them. And then similarly in the
recruitment center condition, anybody who was interfering,
intimidating, blocking or what have you, the access to a
facility where military recruitment is going on, they're
breaking the law and the police can stop that too.
Now, there was one other thing that we measured
here; the cultural worldviews and problems of our subjects
and just preferences about how society should be organized
along
two
different
dimensions,
individualism,
communitarianism, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. And we
measure that by having the subjects respond with a graded
scale to statements, do they agree with them or disagree with
them and how strongly. Things like, it's not the government's
business to try to protect people from themselves. It's kind
[12]
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of an individualistic sensibility, or the government should
put limits on the choices the individuals can make so that
they don't get in the way of what's good for society. You're
more collectivist if you agree with that, that our society
would be better off if the distribution of wealth is more equal
than to egalitarian. And then something like this, society as
a whole has become too soft and feminine. Now, that's kind
of a traditionalist view.
So that's how we measured the cultural outlooks.
And for our purposes, the communities who have these
combinations of values that are reflected in the twodimensional representation of the cultural worldviews,
they're performing the same functions in our experiment as
the students' college affiliations did, and they saw a gain,
right. These are the groups who share these values with
respect to which people are going to be judging by disputed
evidence, in order to find that the status of their group in
competition with other groups is actually predominant.
You have here the lawsuit by people who have
distinctive, very strongly held and contested political
positions, and that's going to put pressure on the study
subjects to conform what they're seeing when they watch the
tape to the outcome that's consistent with what their own
group's values are.
And so here's what we saw. In the abortion clinic
condition, the egalitarian individualists, they formed
rather—well, they formed attitudes that were anti-protestor,
like—either like egalitarian—kind of like libertarians. In
their view, the police didn't go too far and shouldn't be
enjoined from stopping this kind of demonstration in the
future because of that, like the abortion protestors, that's
what they thought they were, had crossed the line from
speech to intimidation.
The higher up communitarians, in contrast, they
thought that the police had clearly gone too far. And these
are people who have more traditional values. They tend to
[13]
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subscribe to the pro-life position, and for sure, the officers
should be enjoined from doing this thing again in the future.
Now, that was the response if they had been assigned to the
abortion clinic conditions.
If they were assigned to the recruitment center
condition, then they flipped around completely. All right.
And we also, of course, have the egalitarian,
communitarians, and the higher up individualists, they don't
care that much about abortion, but they were clearly very
polarized in the military recruitment condition. All right.
And the reason that they came to these conclusions
is that they actually thought they were seeing different kinds
of things. Right. People who have the—well, in any
condition, people with one set of values would disagree with
people who had other sets of values of whether, in fact, the
protestors were blocking entry to the building and whether
they were screaming in the face of onlookers. But across the
conditions, right, people with the same values were
disagreeing with each other. They are disagreeing with their
counterparts in the other condition. If you thought you were
watching the abortion condition, then you had very different
reactions from somebody who had values like you in the
military recruitment center condition.
All right. So people are conforming their
impressions to the outcome that is most in line with their
group's values. And you can see why this is going to be a
problem for the First Amendment. I don't know if you
recognize that the—does anybody get those Supreme Court
advocate trading cards? Because here's—this is a woman
who actually argued a case to the Supreme Court and won,
and her name is Shirley.1 She's from the Westboro Church,
which is a hate group, and they're very emphatic, that's
exactly what they are, who hate gays, for example. And you
see they used to go around to the funerals of soldiers who
died fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan and they would say,
1

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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well, this is vengeance by God for the United States being
too tolerant of homosexual rights. And as you can imagine,
that didn't make the parents of the soldiers feel very good.
So one of them sued the Westboro Church, right, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and they got
some big judgment. It was reduced on appeal, but not by
much, like five million dollars. And so they're appealing to
the Supreme Court, saying this is contrary to the First
Amendment to punish us on these grounds. And, in fact, they
won. I don't think that that's really a surprise because the
theory of the case that they were—that was presented against
them, it kind of runs headlong into one of the essential pillars
of First Amendment law, the non-communicative harm
principle.
See, the Court said: “The record confirms that any
distress occasioned by the Westboro's picketing”2 —I mean,
there's clearly distress, right, people are being severely
traumatized by what they're doing. It “turned on the content
in viewpoint of the message conveyed rather than any
interference with the funeral itself.”3 And you recognize this
because you can generalize it. If you regulate people
engaged in speech activity, you have to have some goal or
interest that can be defined independently of people just not
liking the speech. It's not a cognizable harm that they were
upset by the content of the speech—I mean, clearly, here the
content of the speech is what upset the parents.
If the protestors had been saying, you know,
welcome home, thank you, we appreciate your sacrifice, this
wouldn't have happened. But if the harm is one that can be
defined independently of First Amendment, then there's
room for regulation. Interference with the funeral itself,
right, they're blocking the procession and may be hitting
people over the head with the sign, you can define the harm
that's being inflicted there independently of whatever point
2
3

Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457.
Id.
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they were trying to make by speaking, or even whether they
were speaking at all. All right.
So we have—have this important First Amendment
principle. It's reflected in the two laws that I showed you.
They're trying to identify the kinds of non-communicative
harm that people can suffer when they're subject to
intimidation and threatening and so forth.
But here's the problem, right, if when fact finders
are trying to determine whether the conditions of those laws
are consistent with the First Amendment have been satisfied,
their perceptions are going to be sensitive to the values of the
protestors. They're more readily going to find the noncommunicative harm principle to be satisfied when they
don't like the message of the protestors than when they do.
So in making these kinds of factual determinations under the
influence or pressure of identity protective cognition, they're
actually recreating a legal regime that determines whether
people can engage in protests based on the values that they
have. And that's really going to be a—prove to be a problem
for the First Amendment. And some people think that's what
the Supreme Court or even state courts are doing, they're
being too political, maybe because they're reasoning in this
way. And, I guess, you know, the question—
Did you say I could ask questions and quiz people
or—
PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Sure.
PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: Do you think our
study actually supports this anxiety on the part of the public
that judges are, in fact, political in their ruling? Do you think
it does? I mean, there's one—do you think so?
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I don't know.

[16]
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PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: Well, I thought you
were raising your hand. You need to get into the action here.
But you see, you know, the study, I told you, we did
it on lay people. I mean, not people with any legal training,
much less judges, right. And it's not new to the law that
sometimes people are going to be biased politically and that
it might even unconsciously affect their judgments. That's
why you have strict scrutiny of laws that abridge the First
Amendment, whether it's incidentally or not to see, well,
were people really motivated by something else that they're
not expressing here? We train the prospective lawyers to be
able to apply these rules.
Now maybe—maybe the judges are going to be
affected in the same way, but it's a question begging given
that the judges that have been trained and allowed to
experience the kinds of reasoning that lawyers do. They say,
well, you must be like the public. And that's exactly what
they're going to do, they're kind of checking influences in the
public.
The only way we can figure out whether judges are
going to react similarly is to do a study with judges in it. All
right. So here's the second study. They saw a statutory
ambiguity. And in this one, we had members of the public,
students, lawyers and judges. Right. It was a fifteen hundred
member sample, and we had all of these groups so we could
kind of make some comparative judgments. And it's about
ambiguous statutes. There are two statutes. One said that you
can't deposit junk or debris in a national park. And so here
we have a national park. I guess it's running along the TexasMexico border and we have people who left water—plastic
water containers in this wildlife preserve or this national
park with the expectation that they might come back and
refill them and drink it. Well, is that depositing debris in the
protected area? All right. That's a statutory ambiguity to have
to try to figure out whether that's debris. Maybe it's not
debris, they're going to drink out of it. But maybe it is
[17]
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because, I don't know, a coyote might try to eat it and choke
or something like this. All right.
In the other—the other ambiguous statute, you have
a police officer who admittedly, knowingly distributed
confidential law enforcement material to a nongovernmental actor—that would never happen now, but it
was a hypothetical. And the question is, when the statute
says if you knowingly violate the standards and you're
guilty, do you have to prove not only that he knew that he
was distributing the confidential information to somebody
who wasn't a law enforcement official, but knew that a
violation would be something for which he could be
punished. It's a classic mistake of law problem. Right. We
see these kinds of things all the time. And sometimes it
comes out one way and it knowingly applies not to the law,
but only to the facts. And sometimes the other way, you have
to know about the law. So we had that ambiguity too.
Now, again, we had experimental manipulation
[indiscernible]. Right. These have to do with the identity of
the parties. Right. So in the first case, where the issue is
whether leaving the water—refillable water containers in the
park is to be depositing debris. In one condition, the study
was told that these were construction workers and maybe the
people who are going to build President Trump's wall. Right.
In the other condition, they were told that these were
immigrants' rights activists who were worried that when
people were trying to cross the border illegally, they might
get thirsty and want to drink from these containers.
And no matter how you feel about the motivations
of the actors, whether they're construction workers or
immigrant aide workers, it doesn't make any difference to
what the outcome is. The question is just whether when you
leave the plastic bottle, refillable bottles in the desert, you're
depositing debris.
In the second case with the disclosure, we vary the
identity of the party to whom the disclosure was being made.
[18]
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Right. So in one case, we had the officer who knew he was
distributing the confidential information, giving it to a prolife counseling center and saying, watch out, right, there's an
abortion rights advocate who is trying to apply under false
pretenses to work with you, so you better be careful. And in
the pro-choice condition, the same thing, the officer
saying—that they're telling the pro-choice facility, watch
out, there's an abortion rights advocate who is trying to apply
to sabotage your efforts. And, again, that doesn't really have
any bearing whatsoever on the legal standard. All right. You
have to determine whether his knowing violation is required
or not.
But we did expect that that manipulation, as well as
the one in the first case, could give a lot of motivation,
unconscious most likely, to construe the reading of the
statute to the position that was consistent with the identity of
the study subjects. And so we're going to see that the relative
impact of the manipulation on members of the public,
students, lawyers, and judges. And so to start with the public
and the judges, here's what we found. That in the layperson's
standpoint, you saw again that people were polarizing
depending on what condition they were in, and in ways that
were congenial—held congenial to their own cultural values.
They did that in both of these cases.
Judges, however, they weren't very different from
each other. Right. They're converging on a particular
outcome, no violation in the littering case regardless of who
it is. And the same with the disclosure case. Right. It's a
violation of the law regardless of the condition, regardless of
their values.
Now, I can have a fancy statistical model, like this,
where they put little asterisks down here that say, see, now
you know, you better believe me, or something like this. If
somebody does that, if they give you a chart like this and tell
you that their conclusions have been satisfied, demand your
money back. Right. That's what I'm going to do, have you to
[19]
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demand your money back. So what you have to do is that
this kind of information, it's not even by—it is by itself
intelligible or easy to understand for somebody who is
actually familiar with how these statistical models work. It's
come up with some way that represent what the elements of
the model mean in practical terms. All right.
So here's what I do. I use a simulation. This is kind
of how Nate Silver determines who's going to win the
election. I wouldn't say that given that he [indiscernible] job
for the last time. Right. But you plug the values into the
model that reflects whatever set of conditions you want it to
test for. Right. And maybe you say, well, I want a
hierarchical individualist that's a judge in the immigrant
rights component, the control group would end the littering
problem, and the formula—the model will spit out the
answer. Right. But it does it with a kind of spitting. It doesn't
do it with its hand. It hands out an answer with kind of a
shaky hand. Right. So it imposes a little bit of random noise
into the estimate reflecting the overall error in the model's
various components. And it does that once. And then it does
it again and again and again, about a thousand times. And
then you can represent what the entire probability
distribution is for somebody like that coming up with a
conclusion to find a violation. So the hierarchical—if they're
a hierarchical individualist in the construction group, you're
not very—well, forty percent likely to find that there was a
violation, well, plus or minus seven percent.
If you're a hierarchical individualist in the
immigrant rights condition, well, then you're much more
likely to find a violation. It's seventy-five percent. So that's
a difference in thirty-four percentage points. If you're an
egalitarian communitarian and you're in the immigrant rights
condition, it looks like you're around fifty percent. But you're
twenty-seven percentage points behind the hierarchical
individualist for whom the conviction outcome was much
more culturally congenial than it was to the egalitarian
[20]
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communitarian.
And the egalitarian communitarian in the
construction scenario, twenty-three percentage points
difference between what the egalitarian communitarian
would have found in the immigrant rights conditions. So
they're polarizing. Right. It looks a lot like the last study.
And you get similar kinds of results, polarization in the
disclosure case. Right.
Now, let's look at the judges. You see, they're all
smooshed [sic] up against each other. There's very little
difference in what's going on in the littering version of the
problem. It doesn't matter to whom—who the parties were
to the judges. Right. No significant differences. But they're
all basically of a piece—one piece of mind on what the
outcome should be in the disclosure case. So those are pretty
strong results showing that the public is subject to the
identity protective cognition kinds of influences, but the
judges aren't. And you can kind of generalize this, call this
the identity protective cognition impact.
I mean, how many percentage points more likely is
someone to find a violation if the person was assigned to the
condition in which a violation would be congenial to that
person's cultural outlooks, as opposed to the condition in
which the finding of the violation wouldn't be congenial to
that person. And it's about twenty-two percentage points for
a member of the public—twenty-two percentage points more
likely to find it's a violation if it's congenial culturally than
non-congenial. And for the judges, that's minus five percent,
plus or minus twelve percent. It's not meaningfully different
from zero. And you've got a pretty big spread between the
members of the public, twenty-seven percentage points more
likely to be influenced by the congeniality of the conditions
than are the judges.
We could look at the students and lawyers briefly.
The lawyers, they look a lot like the judges. Right. They're
basically agreeing on what the outcome should be regardless
[21]
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of their values and regardless of what condition they're
assigned to. The students, they're looking a little bit more
like members of the public. The effect isn't as big. But, you
know, that's why if there are any students here, we charge
you this much for your tuition so that you can get to be like
the lawyers and the judges and be perfectly neutral. It takes
a lot of work, at least three years of law school. So this is
the—you can do it too with simulations if you like. So judges
and lawyers don't see things the way that ordinary members
of the public do.
And I'm going to try a little experiment here because
this is relevant. What's the mechanism and what's going on?
Why should we understand judges and lawyers to be
resisting these kinds of influences? And I guess the question
in the first study, can you tell—this is a baby chick. Do you
think it's male or female? Can you tell just by looking? Do
we have any chick sexers in the audience? Well, you're
laughing, but you wouldn't be if the chick sexers all went on
strike because that would be really devastating to the poultry
industry.
You see, chick sexers, they perform this extremely
important function when the baby chick is just a few hours
old. They're segregating the male from the female ones. And
see, the female ones, well, they're going to have juicier meat.
They're going to lay eggs. The male ones, they're going to
peck at the female ones and they're not very good for eating
and they don't produce the eggs. Well, you keep a few who
lead a kind of privileged existence. The others, you're just
tossing them away. And they're coming down a conveyor
belt, okay. And if it's male, you throw it in that—and these
guys are ninety-nine percent accurate.
And what makes this kind of astonishing is there's
no visually ascertainable difference between the anatomical
parts in question for male and female chicks at this stage of
life. And you ask a chick sexer, how do you do this. And if
he's honest, he goes, I don't know, you know. Somebody else
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might say, well, I do it this way, you know, the male chick,
he always tries to distract you. And he says something like
how many games out of first place are the Red Sox, or
something like that. That's confabulation. That's not what
you're doing. And we know how somebody became an
expert chick sexer from the tutelage of a chick sexer grand
master, right. They went off and the grand master showed
them slides, male, female, female, male, male. And so finally
they developed this kind of intuitive sense of who is the male
and who is the female.
Now, this sounds kind of exotic and weird, but it's
not. In fact, it's completely mundane and ubiquitous. This is
a psychological mechanism known as pattern recognition
where you try to classify a potential instance of some thing,
like a baby chick's gender based on a mental inventory that's
richly stocked with examples because you've been doing this
for a long time, and it's all over the place. That's how we read
each other's emotions. It's how people in aerial surveillance
when they look at the photos can tell Cuba is putting
missiles—Russians are putting missiles in Cuba and maybe
it will happen again soon. Right?
But here's—what—this is what happens, you see,
when you go to the law school. Well, Karl Llewellyn had a
theory very much like this, and this is one of Dean Koch's
favorite writers. Karl Llewellyn called it situation sense,
right, that you're immersed in the—with the culture of the
law. And you start to develop these sensibilities to classify
situations and then determine what the right result is. And
that's why you get the tremendous convergence among
lawyers and judges on admittedly vague kinds of statutes.
Right? So that's what law school is. Right. It's the proximate
causation, unreasonable restraint of trade, material
misrepresentation. You keep showing the slides. You keep
showing the examples and eventually students are going to
get this kind of thing.
And that's what's going on, at least that's what I—
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the theory we had when we did this study, that there's this
kind of ingrained professional judgment that judges are
going to have because they're immersed in a certain kind of
culture that started with going to law school, but continued
after that. And, you know, that's judges seeing things
different from how ordinary members of the public do. But
we still have this little proviso, except when they don't see
things differently. And, you know, we also measure the
cultural outlooks, as I've said, of the subjects in this study.
Usually we use this measure to try to understand why people
are fighting about different kinds of risks. And so it turns out
that members of these groups, they form kind of clusters of
perceptions about risk; environmental risk, guns and gun
control, gays in the military, gay parenting, marijuana
legalization, HPV vaccination. All the kinds of hot-button
issues that you're careful when you first meet somebody and
you don't get into that until you know them a little better.
And we did that for the judges in this case. And the
public and the students, they both showed the characteristic
polarizations on the issue of whether global warming was
happening, right, but so did the lawyers and so did the
judges. And the public was divided on legalization of
marijuana. There's really not that much difference in how
students, lawyers, and judges saw things. And so you get a
sense, if the reason that judges are able to be neutral is that
they have this situation sense that is a consequence of being
immersed in the culture of the law. But when you're outside
of that domain, there's no reason to expect them to be any
different from anybody else. And that was true of our judges.
So it's a kind of domain specific immunity. It's not the—it's
not that the judges became superheroes because they're
always kind of pumping justice in the weight room or
something and they're never going to be experiencing any
bias. But when they do their job, then they apply the habits
of mind that are instinctive to what they're doing. So
sometimes they actually do see things the way the public
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does.
Now, you can see why this is generally good,
because it means that if a judge is assessing the kinds of
issues that might arise on remand in Shirley's case, whether
the protestors crossed the line on the non-communicative
harm principle, they should be able to do that pretty well.
And, in fact, that case came out eight to one in the Supreme
Court.4 And just a couple terms later, there was a Supreme
Court case in Massachusetts that had a very protective or
restrictive, depending on how you look at it, provision on
how close people can come to people at the abortion clinic
to try to influence them.5 And they said, no, you can't do that.
It was a nine to zero opinion.6 And they said you've got to
follow the kind of standards that are in the Freedom of
Access to Clinic[] [Entrances] Act, which is what's on the
right. 7 And so that's pretty good. Judges are being pretty
neutral. But here it can also be kind of bad sometimes.
And I'll give you an example, from trial
administration—and it's another study actually that we did
in Scott v. Harris8. The issue was whether when the police
use deadly force against a fleeing motorist, meaning
ramming their car into his and causing it to spin out, it's
clearly deadly force. Are they justified in using deadly force
under the Fourth Amendment under those circumstances?
And there was a video, right, of the chase. And the late
Justice Scalia said that's the scariest thing I've seen since The
French Connection,9 right, and he probably hasn't even seen
a movie since The French Connection.
And then you had Justice Stevens—you know,
4

Snyder, 562 U.S. 443.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120E (2012), invalidated by McCullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
6
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518.
7
Id. at 2357.
8
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
9
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
(No. 05-1631).
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Justice Breyer, the same thing, said he almost wet his pants
when he saw it.10 It was terrifying. And we had one justice,
right, Justice Stevens who said, well, that didn't scare me.
That's the way it looks when I'm really in a hurry to make it
to court when you have to pass somebody on a two-lane
road.11 You know, some kind of Mr. Magoo or something
like that. I knew you guys would get that. And so, you know,
all he could do was say thank you to Justice Scalia and to
Justice Stevens because they decided that people should just
decide for themselves. And this is the first Supreme Court
decision with a hyperlink in it.12 Watch the video and decide
for yourself. They both are convinced it's going to come out
this way.
And, again, we have a model. We gave this to fifteen
hundred people. And we can simulate how different kinds of
jurors would react. Right. So you've got Ron who lives in
Arizona, and he doesn't like the government touching his
junk, right. But he's still relatively hierarchical and has
strong opinions about who should do what in the household
and so forth. And then we've got Bernie, who is a—he was
even for several years before Bernie ran for president, a
professor in Vermont who has very kind of hands-off views
about regulations. People should be allowed to use
marijuana and so forth. But if people are having trouble, the
government should help them—he's got a kind of socialist
orientation. Then there's Linda, who's a social worker in
Philadelphia and she goes along with Bernie on a lot of
issues except drugs. She thinks kids have to have more
discipline. And, finally, there's Pat; and Pat, well, is sort of
average in social outlook, average in income and average in
gender. Pat is the survey mean, right, just an average
American who doesn't exist. You see, people have opinions
that reflect who they are. And there's nobody who is just a
10

See Scott, 550 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 378 n.5 (majority opinion).
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little bit of everything. Right. Ron, very likely to agree with
the Supreme Court's outcome on the issue—the factual issue
that the driver in Scott v. Harris was posing a deadly risk to
others. Right. Then you've got Linda and Bernie who have a
little bit more noise in their simulated values. But they think
that's—no, and that's not—they're not very likely to find that
outcome. And then there's, of course, Pat. And Pat's closer
to Ron.
But here's the issue, right, whether when you have
people disagreeing like this, is the disagreement sufficiently
strong and you're just going to basically have summary
judgment, which is what the Supreme Court ruled in that
case, eight to one. Right. That it would be summary
judgment because no reasonable juror could watch the tape
and come to any other conclusion, but that this guy was a
death machine on wheels. Right. No, it's not true. People
who have different experiences, different identities, they
might come to a different outcome. Maybe they're going to
lose, you know, but the question is whether they should have
a—at least have a chance to be heard by people in the
community who don't agree with them and at least get a
chance to maybe tell them why they feel differently. It can't
be the case that summary judgment is warranted because the
views of people like Bernie and Linda are just not
reasonable. These are reasonable people.
And I think this is a consequence of—really of
situation sense. The judges don't see things the way members
of the public do. And when they have to predict what
members of the public might think, they're at a risk of error
that they're going to be imposing their own outlooks on that
prediction. They need to do a better job on that.
The second problem is I think even more
significant. I call it the neutrality communication problem.
And, again, I want to go on a little detour here and get into
science communication because my lab also studied both
kinds of issues. And we wanted to know, well, how do
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people form their understandings of scientific incentives on
these kinds of issues. So what we did was we showed them,
right, three people who look like they're pretty much experts
on their subject matters. But they're—well, they all went to
good schools. One went to a really great school. It's in my
contract. I have to say stupid things like that whenever Yale
and Harvard are on the same slide. Right. But they all went
to elite schools. They're on the faculty at these prestigious
universities. All members of the National Academy of
Sciences. And we say, well, do you think that this is a
genuine expert on the issue of climate change or, you know,
gun control or nuclear waste. Right.
And we picked those issues because we know that
people are very divided in these two cultural groups. But we
also, again, have an experimental component. We tell half
the people that the featured scientist is taking the high-risk
position, that climate change is happening and there's
consensus on it and we're going to die if we don't do
something versus the low risk. Right. The computer models,
they're subject to error. It's too early to say. We shouldn't do
anything precipitous. Right. The kinds of arguments that
they recognize.
The same thing with nuclear waste, high risk to put
the waste in deep geologic isolation. No, low risk, that's been
determined to be perfectly safe. And the same thing under
the concealed—carry concealed guns. They make crime
rates go up because more people are armed and there's going
to be accidents and there could be deadly confrontations. No,
it's going to make the crime rate go down because if you
don't know, right, whether anybody you're dealing with is
packing heat, you're kind of on your best behavior. You don't
want to piss them off or anything. You're laughing so I know
they're cultural orientation on that one. Right. Because what
happened is that people when they're making these
judgments about, is this really an expert on this issue, they're
much more likely to form the judgment that the person was
[28]
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a genuine expert when we depicted the expert as taking the
position that was dominant in their cultural group.
All right. These are [indiscernible] seventy-two
percentage points more likely to find that this is an expert
when you're an egalitarian communitarian if it's in the global
warming condition and the person says it's dangerous. Right.
Similarly [indiscernible] effects for all of these issues. Now,
this is just like, or very similar to, they saw a game. Right.
People who have these different kinds of group
commitments, they're looking at evidence that they're
drawing some issue that divided their group from another.
And they're selectively crediting it or not crediting it,
depending on whether it's consistent with their group's view.
Right.
That's why we have what I call the [indiscernible]
communication problem, the persistence of strong partisan
disagreement over issues of simple fact, right, that can be
determined by empirical methods. And in some cases, have
already been extensively studied. Right. Because you're
filtering the information in a way that will make what you
believe, what you think the facts are support your group's
position on these kinds of issues.
Now, you have that because, you see, members of
the public don't have the same kind of professional
judgment. They don't have the inventory of prototypes that
the scientists do. Right. If the scientists are perfectly neutral,
then they're not going to be seen that way by members of the
public who have these different kinds of outlooks. People
aren't going to converge on what the best evidence is.
The same thing is happening, you see, in the law.
Right. People see one of these charged issues like involving
protests, for example. And for them, their own eyes are
telling them, this is what happened. Right. And, you know,
it doesn't matter it was eight to one in Shirley's case, nine to
zero in McCullen v. Coakley.13 Okay. People are going to
13
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say, how could the justices do this? How could the State
Supreme Court justices do this? How could a trial court—I
can see it with my own eyes, they must be biased. And as
these things accumulate, everybody becomes convinced that
the courts are political, even if they're not. Right. And not
surprisingly, right, whether you think that they're being
political on the liberal side, well, yes, if you're a
conservative. Or they're being political on the conservative
side, yes, if you're a liberal, but not if you're a conservative.
So you get the same kind of disagreement about whether the
court itself is being political and why.
And this can very positively account for the
declining public confidence in courts. The courts are being
political. Even if they're not, right. Well, the judges—new
proposition here, judges and lawyers need to learn to see
what ordinary members of the public see as part of their
professional craft, right. The same way—doing good
science, is that the same thing as communicating what it
means? Because doing good science depends on the kinds of
habits that modern scientists have that most of the public
don't. So you use the kinds of techniques that I have been
showing you to try to figure out how to communicate science
so that the validity of it is recognized by people who don't
have the kinds of insights that the scientists do.
Well, there's a neutrality communication problem.
No matter how impartial courts are being on these kinds of
hot-button issues, it is the case that members of the public
who don't like the results are going to see it as politically
biased. Well, we need a new science of traditional neutrality
communication. Just doing good judging doesn't by itself
certify to members of the public that it's good judging or that
it's neutral. But that's something that we ought to address
within our profession, and starting with the education of law
students.
So what should we do in that regard? Well, you tell
me. You have more understanding of this as judges, as
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practicing lawyers—you know what they say about those
who can do and those who would rather not because it's so
easy and fun to teach law, or something like that. But your
intuitions are better than mine. You know, is there something
with opinion writing? Is it the kind of common exaggeration
that we know that eight—judges in the majority says,
eighteen arguments, they all come out this way. A judge
says, eighteen arguments, they all come out that way. Right.
And maybe in a Supreme Court, which is already selecting
the cases based on whether there's disagreement about it in
the lower courts. It can't be the case, it's that simple. But they
always—the judge is always right that it is that way. Maybe
that has an impact on people who will believe that the
decision is wrong, that there's no convincing of any kind of
uncertainty. I don't know. This is what judges have told me
you might want to consider. Or maybe that you would have
some kind of additional public outreach so that people could
learn more about the decisions in terms that they could
understand and evaluate them as to whether they're neutral
or not. Maybe a judicial selection criteria should reflect
something like this. I don't know.
We should do things in legal education. Well, what?
Right. What we really need is the creation of evidence-based
capacity and practice in the judiciary. We look—where the
judges and lawyers traffic in facts, the system that we
attribute to is supposed to ascertain the truth. Well, we
should use the kinds of empirical methods that are
appropriate for assessing the performance of ourselves to see
whether we, in fact, are projecting—teaching people about
facts, ensuring that facts govern in the cases that we decide.
All right.
So you tell me what would be a good way to help
address this question, and then I'll help you by measuring
and using the same kinds of methods that I've been talking
to you about today. And that brings us to the close with the
highlight on Pat, a very important member of our project.
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